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  Deep Spirit: Intersubjectivity






Intersubjectivity


Exploring Consciousness from the Second-Person Perspective



Christian de Quincey, Ph. D.
John F. Kennedy University


Abstract


Today, the study of consciousness within Western science and philosophy is polarized between, on the one hand, investigations of third-person, objective, correlates (e.g. neuroscience and cognitive science) and investigations of first-person, subjective, experience and phenomena (e.g. introspection and meditation), on the other. These two perspectives set the terms of debate in contemporary consciousness research: Is consciousness first-person subjective or third-person objective? How can we bridge the "explanatory gap" between objective brains and subjective minds? Although many participants in this debate recognize that a comprehensive study of consciousness must include both first-person and third-person perspectives (some still hold dogmatically to one perspective or the other), few are exploring consciousness from the second-person perspective.

Although the second-person perspective has been almost entirely overlooked in Western philosophy of mind, the notion of intersubjectivity actually has had significant proponents in other disciplines-such as linguistics, social psychology, psychotherapy, and anthropology. And, in this paper, I propose that intersubjectivity is foundational to both a philosophical understanding of, and an experiential engagement with transpersonal phenomena.

Having clarified what I mean by the key terms "consciousness," "subjectivity," and "intersubjectivity," I follow with a rationale for a second-person approach to consciousness studies. I then survey significant historical precursors to the notion of intersubjectivity in Western philosophy, and go on to propose an evolutionary model of consciousness based on a distinction between intersubjective and interpersonal consciousness-a model that provides a philosophical foundation for the core insights of transpersonal psychology. I conclude by addressing some possible objections to intersubjectivity, and considering implications for a second-person methodology.

Introduction


The Vitality of Human Engagement


Being intensely engaged in relationship with another person is one of the greatest joys of being human. It is, perhaps, the most vital manifestation of consciousness. Yet it is an aspect of consciousness that, for the most part, has been overlooked in transpersonal psychology and the emerging field of consciousness studies. This approach to consciousness calls for a shift of perspective--from looking at the world as a collection of objects, or even as a collection of subjects, to a view that sees relationship as fundamental.

This perspective has not been completely ignored, however, in the Western intellectual tradition. For instance, most notably, Jewish philosopher-theologian Martin Buber (1970) recognized the importance of the "I-thou" relationship, and, two and a half thousand years ago, it was the essence of the great dialogues of Socrates at the foundation of Western philosophy.(1) Reading Plato's dialogues, it is clear that Socrates was engaging his students in an approach similar to what I address in this paper. However, whereas Socrates was passionately on the hunt for knowledge (an epistemological quest), I'm advocating a study of intersubjective engagement as a methodology intended to elucidate the nature of consciousness itself (an ontological quest). Both quests, of course, are intimately related. The point I want to emphasize, though, is that it is precisely the degree to which Western philosophy has moved away from the Socratic dialogic influence that the second-person perspective has been sidelined--sidelined but not entirely silenced, as we will see in some detail a little later.

In this paper I argue that in addition to methodologies of first-person subjectivity (exploring consciousness from "within" through meditation and introspection), and third-person objectivity (studying external correlates of consciousness, such as brains and neurons), a holistic science of consciousness would also expand to include second-person intersubjective methodology and epistemology-to account for the inter-reflexivity of consciousness (subjectivity-reflected-in-subjectivity) in "I-thou" relationships. Whereas first-person methodologies, such as meditative practices, lead to "monologic" consciousness (Whorf, 1956), second-person methodologies, such as Bohmian dialogue, lead to "dialogic" consciousness (Bohm, 1985; 1996).

Having situated this intersubjective approach in an historical philosophical context, I will conclude with a proposal for an evolutionary model of consciousness in which intersubjectivity is primary, and suggest the direction in which a second-person methodology for exploration of consciousness might develop.

But before we look at the historical roots of dialogic philosophy, and why they failed to blossom, it will help if we are clear about the key terms: "consciousness," "subjectivity," and "intersubjectivity." Having clarified how I use these terms, I will then state what I believe to be the central philosophical problem regarding these three concepts.

Clarifying Our Terms


Consciousness



Consciousness is notoriously a difficult concept to define. It is paradoxically our deepest mystery and our most intimate reality. Debates in philosophy and psychology frequently run aground in confusion because participants use the word "consciousness" with different meanings. Perhaps we should not try to define consciousness. For one thing, definitions are limiting, and for another, there is no one right way to use the term. "Consciousness" means different things to different people. And because of that, it is important to be clear on the meaning we are using. I prefer to talk about the meaning or meanings of consciousness rather than its definition.

In my experience, the most common misunderstanding arises from a basic confusion between the philosophical and psychological meanings of the term. I find it helpful, therefore, to distinguish between two basic meanings of consciousness:

Philosophical consciousness refers to a state of reality characterized by interiority, subjectivity, sentience, feeling, experience, self-agency, meaning, and purpose. Anything that has any of these has consciousness. Anything that does not would be non-conscious--blank, void, vacuous, wholly objective. This meaning refers to consciousness as context; it is about the mode of being that makes possible any and all contents and forms of consciousness. Philosophically, then, consciousness is a state or quality of being--the fact of consciousness. For example, a person (awake or asleep), a dog, or a worm exemplify consciousness in this sense; a rock, a cloud, or a computer do not. Looked at this way, it is clear that the philosophical meaning is fundamental--for without consciousness as a state of being (i.e. an ontological reality) there could be no psychological states or contents.

Psychological consciousness, on the other hand, refers to a state of consciousness (e.g. awake, dreaming, joyful, fearful, mystical), above threshold awareness. It presupposes the existence of philosophical consciousness. It is about the contents of consciousness (e.g. thoughts, beliefs, images), and about the mode of access (conscious or unconscious) to these contents. Psychological consciousness is typically contrasted with the un-conscious which is below threshold awareness (e.g., asleep, trance, coma, habit, instincts). Unconscious is not the same as non-conscious--the former still has some psychic or subjective activity present, the latter is wholly objective. For example, a person engaged in conceptual cognition is conscious in this sense; a person in a coma, or a worm, are examples of what being unconscious means.

A third meaning of consciousness refers to higher mystical or spiritual states of consciousness typified by experiences of oneness, interrelatedness, compassion, and love. However, because spiritual consciousness is a state of consciousness (albeit higher or highest), it too qualifies as a form of psychological consciousness. It is typically contrasted with "unenlightened" or "unevolved" ordinary states of consciousness.

Whenever we speak about "consciousness" it helps if we are clear about what we mean: Do we mean the state of awareness contrasted with being unconscious (psychological meaning), or do we mean the fact of awareness contrasted with the complete absence of any mental activity whatsoever (philosophical meaning)? There are many other meanings of consciousness-we will look at eight of them later when I discuss an evolutionary model of consciousness--but, I think, this distinction between psychological-content and philosophical-context is basic.(2) It will surface again when we examine the key issue of the relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity.

Subjectivity

also has at least two critical meanings:


o Subjectivity-1: "experienced interiority";


o Subjectivity-2: "private, independent, isolated experience."


Subjectivity-1: In the first case, subjectivity means, essentially, a capacity for feeling that is intrinsic, or interior, to the entity under consideration--a what-it-feels-like-from-within. The key notion here is "experienced interiority" as distinct from vacuous (i.e. without experience) external relations. A subject is constituted by internal relations, and these are felt or experienced. Without experience there could be no subjectivity (and vice versa; in fact, the two words are virtually synonymous); and experience is always internal or intrinsic to the subject-that is to say, experience doesn't "happen to" a subject, it is constitutive of the subject.

Subjectivity has a point of view. It "takes account of," or feels, its own being. Its being is validated, felt, or known from within itself-hence it is first-person--not just from without. It cannot be fully accounted for by external, mechanical relations. A subject lives or endures through time, feeling its own continuity.

Subjectivity-2: In another, related through restricted, sense, subjectivity means an isolated, independent, self-sufficient locus of experience. Classically, this is the Cartesian ego, wholly private, and independent of all reality external to it. In the first case, subjectivity-1, experienced interiority is not automatically self-contained within its own private domain--it is interior, but not necessarily independent or isolated. The question of whether it is self-contained or interdependent is left open: It is possible for subjectivity-1 to be either interior and shared, or interior and private. In this second, Cartesian, case, the subject is not only interior, it is self-contained and private. Such independent egos, or subjects--Leibniz called them "monads"--can communicate only via mediating signals, whereas subjectivity-1 can communicate by participating in shared presence. With subjectivity-1, interiority or feeling can be "intersubjective" and precede individual subjects; in subjectivity-2, interiority is always private, and intersubjectivity, if it occurs, is always secondary. I will be using both forms of "subjectivity" in this paper, but will be careful to indicate, where it is not obvious from the context, which variety I am referring to.

Which brings us to the core question raised by this paper: Which comes first, subjectivity or intersubjectivity? I will return to this in a moment, but first I should clarify what I mean by "intersubjective."

Intersubjectivity



Again, we should make an important distinction between two basic meanings-standard and experiential-with a further sub-distinction of the experiential meaning:


o Intersubjectivity-1 (standard meaning): "consensual validation between independent subjects via exchange of signals." Standard intersubjectivity relies on exchange of physical signals;

o Intersubjectivity-2a (weak-experiential meaning): "mutual engagement and participation between independent subjects, which conditions their respective experience." It is psychological. Weak or psychological intersubjectivity relies on nonphysical presence, and affects the contents of pre-existing subjects;

o Intersubjectivity-2b (strong-experiential meaning): "mutual co-arising and engagement of interdependent subjects, or intersubjects, which creates their respective experience." It is ontological. Strong or ontological intersubjectivity relies on co-creative nonphysical presence, and brings distinct subjects into being out of a prior matrix of relationships.

The basic difference to note here is between intersubjective agreement (1), where my language about the world conforms to yours, through exchange of conceptual and linguistic tokens, and intersubjective participation (2a), or intersubjective co-creativity (2b), where my experience of myself shows up qualitatively differently when I engage with you as a reciprocating center of experience. The first kind, the standard meaning of intersubjectivity, is used to describe what otherwise goes by the name of "objectivity" in science (Velmans, 1992, 1993), and is not what I am concerned with in this paper. I am trying to get at something deeper, something with potentially profound implications for philosophy of mind and consciousness studies in general.

In the second (and third) sense, intersubjectivity happens through participation and mutuality, and we don't even have to agree. In fact, the vitality of this form of intersubjectivity is that it is often heightened by authentic disagreement and exploration of differences.

Let's look more closely at these distinctions:

Intersubjectivity-1: This standard meaning derives from Cartesian subjectivity (isolated, independent subjects). Here, individual subjectivity ontologically precedes intersubjectivity. Individual, isolated subjects come first, and then through communication of signals arrive at consensual agreement. Here, the "inter" in intersubjectivity refers to agreement "between" subjects about so-called objective facts--and the subjects don't even have to interact (their agreement could be validated by a third party, as indeed is often the case in science).

Intersubjectivity-2a: Here, the sense of individual subjects remains, but now intersubjectivity refers to how the experience or consciousness of participating subjects is influenced and conditioned by their mutual interaction and engagement. The emphasis here is on the "experienced interiority" of the subjects as they interact, not on their "objective" agreement about some item of knowledge. Although this is a significant shift of emphasis from the standard meaning of intersubjectivity, nevertheless it is "weak" compared with the "strong" shift we will look at below. It is "weak," not because the participation and engagement involved is weak--indeed it could be intense--but because it refers to changes that happen to the form of consciousness of the participating subjects, not to the fact of such consciousness. It is "weak" insofar as it refers to the contents, not the context, of consciousness. It is a "weak" meaning of intersubjectivity because it addresses psychological rather than philosophical issues; it is "weak" because it still posits subjectivity as ontologically prior to intersubjectivity. Here, the "inter" in intersubjectivity refers to the mutual "structural coupling" of already existing experiencing subjects, where the interiorities of the participating subjects are interdependently shaped by their interaction.

Intersubjectivity-2b: This is the most radical meaning, and one that offers the most promise to transpersonal psychology. According to this "stronger" meaning, intersubjectivity is truly a process of co-creativity, where relationship is ontologically primary. All individuated subjects co-emerge, or co-arise, as a result of a holistic "field" of relationships. The being of any one subject is thoroughly dependent on the being of all other subjects, with which it is in relationship. Here, intersubjectivity precedes subjectivity (in the second, Cartesian, sense, but subjectivity in the first sense, of experienced interiority, is implicit throughout). The fact, not just the form, of subjectivity (second, Cartesian sense) is a consequence of intersubjectivity. Here, the "inter" in intersubjectivity refers to an "interpenetrating" co-creation of loci of subjectivity--a thoroughly holistic and organismic mutuality.

The Big Question: Which Came First: Subjectivity or Intersubjectivity?


Given these distinct meanings of intersubjectivity, we are faced with five questions for philosophy of mind and consciousness studies: (1) Is the basic distinction between the standard meaning of intersubjectivity as "consensual agreement" and the other two experiential forms identified here legitimate? (2) If the distinction is valid, do interacting subjects actively shape the form and content of each other's experience? and (3) if so, can one subject have direct access (not mediated by signals) to knowledge of how the other experiences this change? And (4) through this knowledge of how "I" show up in "your" experience, can I come to know something about my own consciousness? Finally, (5) does intersubjectivity actually create individual subjectivities, is it ontologically primary, or does intersubjectivity presuppose already existing centers of subjectivity?

In answer to (1), if we accept the first meaning of subjectivity ("experienced interiority")--and what else could subjectivity mean if we excluded this?--I believe that we need a way to account for phenomenological data, such as experiences of rapport, empathy, and love between interacting subjects, which prima facie cannot be wholly explained in terms of exchange of linguistic or other signals. Phenomenologically and logically, therefore, the distinction is valid: Intersubjectivity cannot be restricted to the standard meaning of "consensual validation" of observations via exchange of physical signals.

In answer to (2), "Do interacting subjects actively shape the form and content of each other's experience?" volumes of data from social psychology, communications theory, psychoanalysis, anthropology, not to mention much commonsense folk psychology--plus the answer to (1) above--hardly leave us any doubt: Interacting people do influence and condition each other's experience and contents of consciousness (how else could communication occur?). If this were the full extent of the expanded meaning of intersubjectivity, the point would be trivial. It is questions (3), (4), and (5) that raise controversial epistemological and ontological issues for philosophy of mind and consciousness studies.

For if we can answer yes to (3)--"Can one subject have direct access (not mediated by signals) to knowledge of how the other experiences this change?"--then the epistemological tradition we have inherited from Kant and the Enlightenment would be radically undermined. The hoary problem of other minds would finally have a solution. If both this and (4)--"Through knowledge of how 'I' show up in 'your' experience, I can come to know something about my own consciousness"--are true, the implications for a second-person methodology in consciousness studies would be far-reaching.

But if (5)--"Intersubjectivity actually creates individual subjectivities, and is ontologically primary" should turn out to be true, then pretty much the entire edifice of conventional philosophy and science, based on an ontology of substance (both of matter and mind) would be seriously challenged. For how could there be intersubjectivity without there being always-already existing subjects? How could there be relations without pre-existing relata? Commonsense, and even logic, seem to demand that for there to be relationship there have to be things to relate in the first place. Given an ontology of substance (whether of physical energy or of Cartesian minds), the primacy of relata seems compelling. However, we have examples of alternative ontologies from, for instance, Alfred North Whitehead (1979) and Buddhism (Macy, 1991), where process is ontologically fundamental. These ontologies present coherent accounts where relationships are primary, where relata are constituted by their relationships. In such cosmologies, intersubjectivity precedes subjectivity (Cartesian sense). Of course, even in these alternative ontologies, intersubjectivity presupposes subjectivity in the sense of "experienced interiority."

Whereas the fact of experienced interiority is a precondition for intersubjectivity, the forms of individual subjectivities (how that interiority is shaped and experienced in individual subjects) need not--and in the cases of Whitehead and Buddhism do not--require pre-existent Cartesian subjects. Such "forms," co-created as perishable centers of experience in the interplay and flux of intersubjective fact, are the individual subjects.

Whether we go all out, and try to make a case for this strong version of intersubjectivity (with its profound philosophical implications) or keep our sights on a closer horizon by focusing on the "weaker" sense of intersubjectivity (with its implications for psychology and studies of the contents of consciousness) we still need to make a break from the conventional dichotomy of studying the mind from either a third-person or first-person perspective. We need to introduce a second-person perspective into our studies of consciousness.

I now turn to the ideas of some major thinkers in the Western philosophical tradition, and highlight key issues they have raised--issues that stand as mileposts on the way toward a philosophy of intersubjectivity. Building on these precursors, I will present my own rationale for taking the second-person perspective seriously.

Precursors: Steps Toward Intersubjectivity


Historical Overview


Despite philosophy's distance from Socrates, engaged interpersonal relationship continues to run through European philosophy as a backdrop, or hidden tributary, to the individualism that has dominated Western thought since Descartes, Kant, and the Enlightenment.

An interest in interpersonal relations is there, for example, in the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard (1987), in Husserlian phenomenology (Husserl, 1995; Mensch, 1988), and in existentialists, such as Jean-Paul Sartre (1960; 1969) and Ludwig Binswanger (1963). Sartre believed that consciousness is a dialectical relationship between self-affirmation through choice and self-nihilation through interactions with others beyond the self, and that pre-reflective subjectivity necessarily precedes reflective intersubjectivity--for Sartre, consciousness is a pre-reflective experience of presence (Aboulafia, 1986, p. 37). Binswanger believed that subjectivity, objectivity and intersubjectivity were related through a dialectical (or "trilectical") "trichotomy," where subjective experience (thesis) is reduced to "total surrender" and "dissolution of the individual life by the objective principle of 'otherness'" (antithesis), and subsequently reemerges by a "reclaiming of objectivity in subjectivity" (synthesis) (Binswanger, 1986, p. 100). And for Binswanger, the shared experience of love is determined by the "corresponding and equal togetherness of me and Thou" (Binswanger, in Frie, 1997), and the "dual mode of love [is] more than the sum of two separate, personal entities" (Frie, 1997).

The philosophical-social psychology of George Herbert Mead (1967) explains how knowledge of "me" is a result of internalizing some external "you." Humanistic psychologist Carl Rogers (1951) developed "person-centered" psychotherapy where the relationship between client and therapist was central; in radical psychiatry, R. D. Laing addressed the topic of "self and other" (1981). More recently, psychoanalysts Roger Stolorow and George Atwood have reinterpreted the transference-countertransference phenomenon in therapy in terms of intersubjectivity (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992; Stolorow, Atwood, & Brandchaft, 1994). In sociolinguistics and linguistic philosophy, Jürgen Habermas (1984; 1992) has developed a detailed account of the intersubjective-social basis for consciousness in his "theory of communicative action" (which we will examine more closely below).

In the Soviet Union during the 1920s and 1930s, social philosophers Mikhail Bakhtin (1981; Morson & Emerson, 1989) and Valentin N. Voloshinov (1996) focused on "dialogue" as a linguistic-based alternative to mechanistic Marxist dialectical materialism (Holquist, 1990). For Bakhtin, individual consciousness was fundamentally a social process--not autonomous cognition--involving "simultaneous differentiation from yet fusion with another" (Baxter & Montgomery, 1996); for Voloshinov, individualistic subjectivism as the source of inner experience was replaced by the idea that experience arises out of social expression through communication within a "sign community" (Arens, 1994)

In France, a major voice in linguistics, Sorbonne professor Francis Jacques (1991), has developed a masterful and original philosophical analysis and critique of subjectivity, a development of the work of Emile Benveniste (1973) and Emmanuel Levinas (1969; 1981), which proclaims the primacy of intersubjectivity and interpersonal relationship. The notion of intersubjectivity also plays a central role in the reflexive model of perception by psychologist Max Velmans (1992, 1993)-although in Velmans' work the term "intersubjectivity" refers to consensual agreement between independent observers, rather than the engagement of subjectivities I am focusing on here. And, more recently, the intersubjective domain of communal interiority is included in Ken Wilber's "four-quadrants" ontological-epistemological model (Wilber 1995). (3)

In addition, the German school of "dialogue philosophers"-including Franz Rozenzweig, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy (Mosès, 1992)-and Americans John Dewey (1949) and Charles Taylor (1989) have contributed to the wider debate on intersubjectivity (Prabhu, 1997). (4)

I do not have the space here to examine all of these precursors in any detail; instead, I will select key philosophers and theorists and say why their contributions to the unfolding of the idea of intersubjectivity is important for the thesis presented in this study-the need to go beyond the subject-object model. The thinkers I have selected (Kant, Fichte, Kierkegaard, Humboldt, Mead, Buber, Jacques, and Habermas) represent either key precursors to, or key exemplars of, the intersubjective approach--following the grand two-thousand-year detour in philosophy since Socrates engaged the hearts and minds of his students in transformational dialogue.

Kant's transcendental ego. The Cartesian subject-object dualism, which locked the experiencing subject in its private world became the model for the modernist epistemology of consciousness. To know itself, the subject would reflect or represent itself to itself--the "mirror model of self-consciousness." But this approach failed--and continues to fail--to deliver up the elusive spontaneous self, the "I" that does the knowing. Kant recognized this, and in his Critique of Pure Reason (1961) demonstrated that the Cartesian ego, as subject, could never be directly available to itself as an introspective object. As an object, the "I" becomes "me," and the spontaneity of the "I" is obliterated. In short the subject can never become an object to itself. At best, the first-person "I" recedes, and in its place an objectified third-person "me" appears. But this "me"-as-object lacks the very autonomy and spontaneity that is the characteristic essence of the "I"-as-subject. The "I" is autonomous, creative and now; the "me" is reflected, and therefore past (a habitual construct in memory, built up throughout a lifetime).

In this Cartesian mirror-model of self-consciousness there is no way to bridge the gap between the autonomous first-person (subject of experience) "I" and the objectified third-person (object of memory) "me." The subject encounters itself only via the mediation of itself as object. For Kant, then, the spontaneous "I" remains "behind the scenes," invisible to itself (and, of course, to others). The spontaneous "I" is transcendental. The phenomenal "me," the aspect of self that appears as an object of knowledge, is merely the empirical ego that lacks autonomy and spontaneity (Hohengarten, 1992).









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