3. Panpsychism

De Quincey then subtly retracts: "Wilber’s ‘interiors’ all the way down and Whitehead’s ‘prehensions’ all the way down are tokens of the same ontological type. This is the essence of panpsychism." Correct, as I myself state on numerous occasions. De Quincey has once again excoriated me for something I do not believe, and then himself retracted his attack in a footnote.

As Wilber can easily tell from the context of the above quote from me, it actually sums up the essence of my critique that he was merely word quibbling when he rejected the idea that feelings go all the way down. I point out that for Whitehead prehensions = feelings = interiors. So, for Wilber to claim that he is a “paninteriorist” and not a panpsychist, because he believes only interiors and not feelings go all the way down, is either a contradiction or hair-splitting.

Just so we’re clear on this: When I say that “Wilber’s ‘interiors’ … and Whitehead’s ‘prehensions’ … are tokens of the same ontological type” I’m saying that if Wilber accepts this (and we see that he does), then, to be consistent, he must also accept that “feelings” go all the way down. But he denies this. He also admits he is word quibbling: “I often say that I am not a panpsychist, I am a pan-interiorist, but that’s just word quibbling.” He then goes on to give his reason for this which amounts to: “a personal preference.”

In other words, my analysis of Wilber’s critique of panpsychism centered on the issue of “feelings all the ways down.” This is the essence of panpsychism—which Wilber admits. But the idea of fundamental feelings is something he dismisses, thereby rejecting the essence of panpsychism. However, he says he accepts Whitehead’s notion of “prehension all the way down.” But this is inconsistent because, for Whitehead, prehension = feeling. And since prehension also equals interior, Wilber cannot consistently claim to be a “paninteriorist” but not a “panpsychist” who accepts that feelings go all the way down.

How Wilber conjures from this that I “subtly retract” my criticism beats me. As before, I neither subtly nor explicitly reject my original criticism. On the contrary, since Wilber admits “I am word quibbling,” he affirms the essential point of that particular critique.

Besides his “personal preference,” he gives a second reason for rejecting the fundamental ontological status of feeling but not of interiors:

the deeper reason I try not to characterize or qualify the nature of interiors is that ultimately (and here I am switching from a relative to an absolute form of argument a la Madhymaka), ultimately the interiors of each holon open directly onto radical, absolute, unqualifiable Spirit or pure Emptiness, so that the interior of each holon acts as an opening or clearing in which other holons can emerge, so that all holons are mutually arising in the clearing that they mutually supply for each other.

Well this sounds far more reasonable. And, in fact, I’m very taken with Wilber’s use of language here attempting to express the ineffable (something, by the way, he is quite skilled at, and something I’ve admired in his writings for many years). [But, Ken, please don’t take this acknowledgement of one aspect of your work as a “subtle retraction” of the aspect I am critiquing; or the fact that I follow this acknowledgement with a further critique of the point at issue as an example of my “typical charity” followed by my “chastising” you. Let’s see if we can hold multiple perspectives . . . ]

However, as much as I agree with the wish to avoid characterizing or qualifying the nature of absolute, unqualifiable Spirit or pure Emptiness (words that alreadycharacterize), I don’t see why using the term “interior” (or, indeed, “holon”) is any less a characterizing of Spirit than “feeling.” In fact, as I pointed out in my JCS paper, “interiority” implies “subjectivity” and “feeling.” What would “interiority” mean if it lacked some sense of “whatitfeelslike” to be?

Given all this, it strikes me as strange that Wilber concludes:

Once again, de Quincey profoundly misrepresents my actual position, and then uses his misrepresentation to attack me as person who lacks feelings and therefore cannot see that feelings span the entire spectrum.

Since Wilber admits that “feelings span the entire spectrum,” he can hardly fault me for pointing out the inconsistency when he blatantly denies this in IP:

Most schools of panpsychism take oneof those interiors—such as feeling or soul—and maintain that all entities possess it (atoms have feelings, cells have a soul) and this I categorically reject [emphasis added] (p. 277).

As for the implied ad hominem (a point I’ve already mentioned), I have never “attacked” Wilber as someone who “lacks feelings.” In fact, I think part of the “tone” problem is that he is troubled by many of them.

Which brings us to the really sensitive issue . . .

4. Style & Tone

I really am surprised and sorry to see that Wilber reads my comments on his style and tone as “four full pages of mean-spirited attack on me as a person.” I prefaced my remarks in JCS—and I’ve reiterated the same point here—that given the volume of words written and spoken on the issue of Wilber’s acerbic style (especially in Sex, Ecology, Spirit, but also in many of his other writings), I would have been remiss not to have addressed it. Furthermore, as I’ve said, given his aversion to acknowledging the ontological role of feeling in the Kosmos, coupled with his frequent, and sometimes mocking, dismissals of feeling-oriented movements such as the Romantics, Eco-loving Greens, and all kinds of evolutionary dead-ends on the “RetroExpress,” I was prompted to look for some deeper, underlying motivation.

In the section of my JCS paper titled “Style and Substance” I explored as fairly and honestly as I could possible connections between Wilber’s psychology and his theoretical stance. My thesis is summed up in the phrase “edifice complex”—by which I mean Wilber’s ostensible passion, drive (maybe even obsession) to build an impregnable rational fortress. I acknowledge his impressive achievement in synthesizing the complex ideas of many diverse scholars and traditions into a masterful integral model.

And I observe that this all-quadrant/all-levels model, despite its span and depth, nevertheless comes across as lacking in feeling, lacking in mystery, lacking in paradox. (In my research, many people made similar comments to me.) I make the point that it’s as if Wilber’s grand edifice is constructed to shut out any possible intrusion of paradox or mystery or feeling. I also acknowledge that the model has placemarkers, such as “visionlogic,” representing the potential for paradoxical perspectives. But Wilber’s discussion of vision logic and subtle states of consciousness, despite the words, does not evoke the sense of mystery or paradox that people often feel when they actually experience extrarational states. His treatment of mystery is much too neat, much too rational. This is a problem of style.

Another, related, problem is his by now infamous “tone.” I won’t stoke the flames here by repeating what I wrote in JCS. If you are familiar with his tone, you won’t need reminding from me. If you are not familiar with it, I see no merit in introducing you to it.

I will just respond to his question:

On what evidence does de Quincey base this assertion? Since he has not met me—and since most of the critics he cites have not met me, either—he is presumably basing his condemnation on my writing alone.

As I said earlier, I did spend a number of hours with him at an intimate gathering, and people I interviewed during my research included some who knew him closely over many years. The point is that I had much sounder grounds for my assessment of his psychological development than he had for assessing Whitehead’s spiritual development. (One of the reasons I wrote about Wilber’s psychology was because, in his first book explicitly about the topic Integral Psychology, he took the liberty of critiquing Whitehead’s spiritual development based merely on his writings. At least I had the benefit of first-hand experience, and second-hand reports from people who knew and know Wilber.

Over and over again, Wilber stresses the unfairness of his critics who dare to comment on his tone and style. Here’s an example:

I repeat, none of those people have met me, none of them know me at all. And conversely, there are no examples of people who know me well going into print saying that I am essentially a mean, angry, vitriolic, or uncompassionate person. Those charges are made only by people who do not know me.

I urge him to think more carefully about such claims.

5. CIIS

Wilber’s emotionality is most stark, and his vitriol most sharp and uncompromising, when the topic of the California Institute of Integral Studies (CIIS), in San Francisco, comes up. Part of the problem, I think, has been Wilber’s self-imposed solitude. For years, he has refused invitations to speak at conferences around the country. I don’t know the details of his relationship with CIIS, but it would not surprise me if I discovered that at some point Ken had been invited to lecture there. If so, as far as I’m aware, he never took advantage of the opportunity.

If he had been around CIIS after the publication of SES, he would have found a group of students and faculty who were anything but an “epicenter” spreading the “word that [Wilber] was a mean, uncaring, uncompassionate, and nonspiritual or even antispiritual person,” as Wilber claims in his response to my paper. In fact, a CIIS colloquium was formed in the wake of SES to discuss, analyze, and debate its ideas over many weeks. Like any such university-level forum, participants included some Wilberphiles, some Wilberphobes, and a bunch of just plain old (and young) students and faculty interested in Wilber’s work. No doubt, part of what fired their interest was Wilber’s trenchant criticism of the work of some of CIIS’s leading faculty (including Stan Grof and Rick Tarnas). Naturally, students (and faculty) would be interested to hear responses to Wilber’s criticisms. By no means was this an “anti-Wilber” cabal, bent on “character assassination,” as he seems to imagine from far away in his house on the hill in Boulder, Colorado.

Less said about Wilber’s remarks on his exchanges with CIIS’s Robert McDermott the better. But one thing immediately clear to anyone who bothers to read the “dialogue” is that on more than one occasion McDermott warm-heartedly offered Wilber an olive branch. Wilber’s response(in print): effectively to snap back and beat McDermott over the head with it.

At times, Wilber’s imaginings about goings on at CIIS border on paranoia. For example, take the following:

As interesting supportive evidence, notice this striking fact: de Quincey got his Ph.D. from CIIS, but in his autobiographical statement in the Journal of Consciousness Studies in which his ad hominen [sic] attack on me appears, he completely omits that fact. He states that he holds degrees from JFK, but as for his Ph.D., he is strangely silent. Odd thing to leave out, isn’t it?

First, during the SES-forum days at CIIS, I was one of Wilber’s chief supporters (I similarly championed him at John F. Kennedy University where I teach consciousness studies).

Second, and more pointedly, I did not omit the fact that I got my Ph.D. from CIIS. If Ken cares to check, he will find that the bio JCS printed along with my critique of IP was the same one used back in 1994 when my first paper for that journal was published. For some reason, there was a mix up at JCS and they printed my old bio instead of the current one sent in with my Wilber essay.

Ken—this directly to you—I have nothing to hide about my affiliation with CIIS. For one thing, I am proud to have studied with some very fine people there, and to have graduated with a doctorate in Philosophy and Religion. For another, my impression of CIIS (students and faculty) is that you have some staunch supporters and some wary (and weary) critics there. And many who just don’t give a damn one way or the other. (You are not on everybody’s radar.) Frankly, it will serve you well to let go of what unfortunately comes across as a persecution complex. What I wrote in my JCS paper had nothing significant to do with my association with CIIS—anymore than it did with the other institutions I’m affiliated with. It was my own personal statement. True, some of the people who read the paper (or portions of it) in manuscript were either faculty or students at CIIS (understandable, given my academic relationship with these scholars). But just as many were not. Also, one significant item you managed to omit from your jibe against CIIS is that one of the CIIS students I acknowledge happens to be one of your most ardent supporters—as you very well know.

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Now that the precedent has been set, I have little doubt that you will read much of what I have written here as further evidence of how critics “misunderstand” you. And I suspect, too, that you are likely to misunderstand at least some of what I say here. I think such misunderstandings are to be expected—almost inevitable—given the complexities and subtleties of the issues we are addressing.

But that is where dialogue could be so helpful. By “dialogue,” I mean a communicative attitude along the lines that David Bohm devised for his groups—a sharing of perspectives in an atmosphere of mutual respect and open listening.

I truly would like for us to get beyond any sense of a philosophical “cage match”—to read each other and talk to each other looking for what is right about the other’s position. And the beauty of dialogue is that we don’t even have to agree—or attempt to shut each other down if we happen to disagree. It’s not about winning points. It’s about listening and learning, about full, honest and compassionate self-expression.

If this sounds like an olive branch . . . it is.

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